

erence intrudes at many places. It is the basis for an effort to classify African states according to a crude distinction between militancy and moderation, based not upon an analysis of the decision-making process or of policies actually followed, but rather upon the orientation of a given state toward the West and its political and economic models. "Moderate policies," writes Lefever, mean "continued cooperation with Western states and the adaptation of Western governmental forms to local requirements" (p. 29). And, of course, "moderation" is in all situations to be preferred to "militancy." Using this frame of reference, Lefever makes numerous statements, unsupported by any argument or evidence, that from outside the framework appear startling and at times incomprehensible. Thus, for example, we are informed that in the Congo and Ghana, Moscow made an effort to "radicalize" politics "by the classic communist tactics of subversion, through trade, loans, military aid, and bribery" (p. 14). How these classic communist tactics of subversion differ from the classic Western methods of influence we are unfortunately not told. Elsewhere we are informed, without the benefit of supporting argument, that in the Congo the Stanleyville regime was "the most serious danger to the integrity of the Congo in its first years," Katanga by comparison being a "far lesser danger" (p. 102).

There is one last troublesome aspect of *Spear and Scepter* that cannot go unmentioned—the author's tendency to make denigrating statements about African culture and history for which he offers neither empirical evidence nor logical argument. Although a number of examples deserve extended comment, space permits a discussion of only one. In a brief analysis of the African role in the history of colonial imposition Lefever includes the following passage:

Physically and politically, tropical Africa was passive: . . . A female continent, Black Africa was to be discovered, penetrated and dominated by others. There were few exceptions to this image of passivity (p. 3).

Now one may quibble with the analytic usefulness of the "female" metaphor, or one may take offense at what may appear to be the intrusion of "male chauvinism," but what is really astounding is the author's failure to take account of the substantial historical scholarship on the subject—scholarship that has clearly shown the responses of African peoples to colonial imposition to have been extremely varied and in many cases the very reverse of passive. Numerous African peoples fought fiercely to

maintain their independence, some engaging in guerrilla operations for as long as a decade. Moreover, research has shown that even those peoples that did not forcibly resist the intrusion of colonial control often acted out of a calculation of their political and economic interest within the African international system of the period—a calculation which, without the benefits of hindsight, was often highly rational.

I do not fault Mr. Lefever because his observations on African culture and history may be perceived as offensive by Africans, or because some of them contradict the overwhelming consensus of research carried on during the past two decades, but rather because he fails to acknowledge and come to terms with this information. When denigrating statements about a people's culture and history are presented as if they had face validity, they take on the appearance of ethnocentrism and chauvinism, rather than scholarship.

ROBERT M. PRICE

*University of California, Berkeley*

**Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts.** By Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. 174. \$5.95.)

*Rebellion and Authority* has all the trappings of contemporary social science. A political scientist (Leites) and an economist (Wolf) team up in an interdisciplinary effort to analyze a major area of contemporary interest, insurgency and counterinsurgency (labeled rebellion and authority, respectively, in an unconvincing effort to neutralize the terms). Claiming balance and objectivity in treating the two sides, the book is laced with a profusion of social science jargon, especially from economics. It is studded with hypotheses, propositions, and counterpropositions.

The substantive burden of the work is well summarized in a blurb on the dust jacket:

The broad aim of this book is to develop a method of analyzing insurgent conflicts—conflicts between Authorities and Rebellions—which approaches the rigor achieved in the analysis of strategic nuclear conflicts. Various concepts are developed, such as the "demand" for and "supply" of rebellion; the "inputs" and "outputs" associated with rebellion; "damage-limiting" and "profit-maximizing" influences on population behavior; and the principles of target selection as they affect the contesting sides. The concepts are applied to specific cases of insurgent conflict on foreign and domestic battle-grounds.

The principal conceptual innovation suggested in the work is a shift of focus from "de-

mand" (popular support) to "supply" (resources): the book stresses the centrality of efficiency and organization for both rebellion and authority rather than popular preferences for the two sides. To this end, the authors examine and reject the "hearts and minds" view of insurgency and set forth an alternative framework that considers insurgency as "a system and an organizational technique."

Insurgency-as-a-system has three principal components: (1) the availability of inputs—personnel, supply, intelligence—and the costs of obtaining them from internal or external sources; (2) the means for converting the inputs—through indoctrination and training, for example—into activities or outputs; and (3) the targeting of the outputs against the existing regime.

Counterinsurgency-as-a-system has three corresponding concerns: (1) impeding the availability of the insurgent inputs and the efficiency of the conversion process; (2) destroying the insurgent outputs already produced; and (3) strengthening the organization and efficiency of the governmental authority so as to withstand the rebellion's onslaught.

The principal conclusion reached is that

for R[ebellion] to win, it *need not* initially have the spontaneous support, sympathy, or loyalty of the people, not even of a significant minority of the people, although it may in fact enjoy such support. Moreover, even fairly far along in the struggle, R can make substantial progress *without* substantial popular endorsement. . . . Thorough organization and effective coercion can enjoin or engender particular modes of behavior by the population . . . (p. 149, emphasis in original).

In other words, effective organization can create public support—or indeed serve as a substitute for public support.

The main contribution of *Rebellion and Authority* is the skillful application of economic theory to the analysis of insurgency. This application, however, rather than adding to our knowledge of the subject or shedding new light upon it, simply recasts existing knowledge in different terms. The work is a prime case in which the application of economics jargon to the study of insurgency succeeds in jargonizing the subject more than elucidating it. As such, *Rebellion and Authority* is only peripherally successful as an interdisciplinary venture. By the same token, it fails in its articulated objective of raising the level of analysis of insurgent conflict to that of strategic nuclear conflict.

One might note in passing that, although the analysis of nuclear conflict enjoys a certain game-theoretical rigor, it fortunately lacks empirical content. By contrast, the analysis of in-

surgent conflict can rely on considerable empirical evidence, but its theoretical rigor has not progressed beyond the writings of Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, Che Guevara, and Regis Debray. The analysis of insurgent conflict has yet to find its Herman Kahn or Thomas Schelling.

The central conclusion of *Rebellion and Authority* is not supported by historical or empirical evidence. While certain aspects of certain insurgencies at certain times may fit certain aspects of the Leites-Wolf analysis, there is not a single case on record that fits the overall framework. In particular, to my knowledge no insurgency movement has ever succeeded in the absence of popular support, its organizational effectiveness notwithstanding. (It should perhaps be noted that Leites and Wolf are themselves divided on the issue: Wolf stresses supply while Leites assigns equal weight to supply and demand. However, since the framework rests primarily on supply, one is surprised to read in the Preface that "both authors fully endorse the analytical approach of the book as a whole.")

Finally, the work is not as objective and balanced in its treatment of the two sides as Leites and Wolf claim. Indeed, the authors themselves are moved to write in the Preface: "Sometimes the posture of the [governmental] authority and, specifically, of U.S. policy in relation to authority, is adopted more completely than perfect balance would warrant" (p. vii). It may be relevant to note that the study was supported by The RAND Corporation, which also holds the copyright to the book.

MOSTAFA REJAI

Miami University, Ohio

**Communications and National Integration in Communist China.** By Alan P. L. Liu. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 225. \$8.50.)

I accepted the task of reviewing this book with great expectation. This was partly because of my personal interest in the subject and partly because of the publisher's promotional literature, according to which this work not only provides a "comprehensive" account of the development of the mass media in China since 1949 but also is "the first study to tie together considerations of (1) comparative politics, (2) the relationships between the mass media and the social system, and (3) the concept of totalitarianism."

Upon seeing the book, however, I was swiftly disillusioned. Except for a few quotations of marginal relevance from such prominent social scientists as Karl W. Deutsch, Alex